I N S I G H T S · Energy Access · Climate Finance · Transition Equity
"The problem is not ambition in Africa. The problem is the financing gap." — Ali Mohamed, Special Climate Envoy, Kenya
1. Introduction: A Target That Assumes a Level Playing Field
At COP28 in Dubai in December 2023, nearly 200 countries committed to tripling global renewable energy capacity to 11.2 TW by 2030. The target was presented as a collective global effort in which all countries would contribute to the expansion of clean energy. Progress appears encouraging. In 2024, the world installed a record 582 gigawatts (GW) of new renewable capacity, extending more than two decades of consecutive annual records. However, the global total does not reveal a striking geographical imbalance. Asia accounted for 72% of new renewable capacity added in 2024, with China alone contributing almost 88% of the region's total. By contrast, Africa added only 4.2 GW, despite possessing some of the world's richest solar resources and a rapidly growing demand for electricity.
This paper argues that the constraint is not primarily technological or political but financial. The same solar or wind project typically faces a cost of capital three to seven times higher in Africa than in Europe or North America. Because renewable electricity is highly capital intensive and has low operating costs, these financing differences translate directly into higher electricity costs and fewer bankable projects.
2. The Geographic Concentration of the Tripling Progress
The record 582 GW of renewable capacity added in 2024 reflects genuine progress. However, it also masks a pronounced geographical concentration. Much of the global increase came from a small number of countries, particularly China, while deployment remained limited across large parts of the developing world.
Africa illustrates the scale of this gap. To achieve its commitment of 300 GW of renewable capacity by 2030, the continent must install around 45 GW annually. At the 2024 deployment rate of 4.2 GW, cumulative additions would reach only about 25 GW by 2030, equivalent to less than one-tenth of the pledged target.
3. Why the Same Technology Costs More in Africa
3.1 The WACC premium and what drives it
For renewable energy projects, financing costs matter as much as technology costs. Solar and wind require large upfront investment but have very low operating costs. As a result, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) becomes a major determinant of the levelised cost of electricity. Utility-scale solar projects in Kenya and Senegal face WACC values of around 8.5 to 9.0%, compared with 4.7 to 6.4% in Europe and North America. Financing costs are even higher elsewhere on the continent, reaching 9.5% to 11% in South Africa and other emerging markets, while electricity projects in Ghana face financing costs exceeding 20%.
3.2 The credit rating bottleneck
As of January 2025, only Botswana and Mauritius held investment-grade sovereign credit ratings in Africa. This matters because many institutional investors, including pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds, are either restricted by their mandates or discouraged by their risk frameworks from investing in sub-investment-grade markets.
4. The Governance Gap: Why the COP28 Model Cannot Close the Gap
The COP28 UAE Consensus established an ambitious global objective but left the central implementation problem unresolved. The agreement commits countries to tripling global renewable energy capacity by 2030. It does not specify how that target should be distributed across countries, assign differentiated financing responsibilities, or establish binding mechanisms to reduce the financing costs faced by countries where renewable deployment remains weakest.
The evidence points to a broader conclusion. Global renewable targets alone cannot produce geographically balanced deployment when the cost of capital differs systematically across countries. Unless international climate governance addresses these financing asymmetries, renewable investment will continue to concentrate in low-risk economies.
5. What Would Actually Change the Deployment Arithmetic
The evidence points to a consistent conclusion. Renewable deployment in Africa is constrained less by technology than by the cost of finance. Four interventions have the strongest empirical support:
- Concessional capital and blended finance — directly reduces financing costs
- Political risk insurance and sovereign guarantees — reduces investment risk
- Credit rating methodology reform — would lower the base-rate component of the financing premium
- Local currency lending — addresses exchange-rate risk
A DNV analysis estimates that if sub-Saharan Africa faced financing costs similar to those in Europe between 2024 and 2050, installed solar PV capacity could reach almost 545 GW by 2050 — nearly 100 GW more than under current financing conditions.
6. Conclusion: Global Financing Transition
The COP28 renewable tripling target may be achieved numerically in Asia. Whether it succeeds as a global climate strategy depends on what happens elsewhere. A transition concentrated in a small group of economies is not the same as a global energy transition.
Closing this gap requires more than higher climate ambition. It requires reducing the cost of capital through greater concessional finance, expanded risk-sharing mechanisms, more effective sovereign-risk assessment, and deeper local-currency financial markets.
"There is no shortage of excellent solar resources and political ambition in Africa, only a shortage of affordable capital." — Léo Echard, Policy Officer, Global Solar Council, 2025